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PAUL TELLER 
DISCUSSION - WHAT IS A STANCE?* 
Van Fraassen is extremely brief in how he characterizes his 
notion of a stance: 
A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, 
approach, a cluster of such - possibly including some propositional attitudes 
such as beliefs as well). Such a stance can of course be expressed, and may 
involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be simply equated 
with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is (48). 
With a view towards expanding and in some respects modifying 
this characterization I will proceed by looking at the arguments 
to see what kind of a position they support. 
1. THE ARGUMENT IN CHAPTER 2 
Van Fraassen characterizes the "received view" of what it is to 
hold a philosophical position as 
Principle Zero: For each philosophical position X there exists a statement 
X+ [the dogma or doctrine of X] such that to have (or take) position X is to 
believe (or decide to believe) that X+ (41). 
The doctrine characteristic of empiricism is labeled "E+": 
A candidate for E+ could be something like 'Experience is the one and only 
source of [factual or contingent] information.' Its exact content does not 
matter to our current argument, as long as it purports to be a factual thesis 
(43).' 
van Fraassen argues that empiricism cannot be consistently so 
characterized. 
Here's my version of the argument: We have not said exactly 
what E+ is: "Experience is the only source of contingent 
information" serves as a rough guide that could be refined in 
many ways. It is required only that E+ says or implies that 
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experience is the only source of contingent information, that 
E+ itself cannot be supported by appeal to experience, and that 
E+ is itself contingent. All of these are very plausible condi- 
tions for a wide range of candidates for E+. But if all these 
conditions obtain, it seems plain that any effort to maintain E+ 
would be self-defeating. 
Here is a slightly different way to present the issue: van 
Fraassen takes a central characteristic of empiricism to be that 
it embodies a "radical critique of metaphysics" (42). And van 
Fraassen interprets this as requiring that E+, whatever it is in 
detail, "...would have to imply the falsity, untenability or 
meaninglessness of all metaphysics" (42). Let us say, to have a 
term that we will want to refine, that E+ implies the rejection of 
metaphysics. But E+, as a factual thesis that goes beyond 
anything supportable by experience, itself counts as a bit of 
metaphysics! So it would seem that E+ implies its own rejec- 
tion. 
Here is what van Fraassen takes this kind of argument to 
show: 
If the empiricists' position consists, in accordance with Principle Zero, in the 
assertion or belief of a factual thesis, then they have no way to demur from 
the very sort of metaphysics they typically attack ... [So] [t]here cannot be 
such a proposition as E+. There is no factual thesis itself invulnerable to 
empiricist critique and simultaneously the basis for the empiricist critique of 
metaphysics. So either empiricism reduces to absurdity or ... Principle Zero 
is violated, ... and a philosophical position need not consist in holding a 
dogma or doctrine (46). 
I submit that what the argument supports is a weaker conclu- 
sion: not that there can be no such proposition E+ to function 
in Principle Zero, but rather that there can be no such propo- 
sition that is held or maintained in a certain way, held as a 
"thesis" in a technical sense that I will specify. If this is right 
then what follows is that either empiricism is not a position that 
works with a doctrine such as E+, or it is a position that does 
advocate an E+, but not as a "thesis". 
In reference to the first formulation of the argument, we are 
assuming that E+ says or implies that experience is the only 
source of support for contingent information and that E+ itself 
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is contingent but cannot be so supported. All that follows is 
that E+ cannot be supported. But this is consistent with saying 
either that there is no E+B, regarded as dogma or doctrine of 
empiricism, or with saying that to be an empiricist is to believe 
such an E+ but, if we are reflective and honest, with no pre- 
tensions to thinking that this belief is rationally mandated. The 
first alternative seems clearly to be the one van Fraassen has in 
mind - do not treat E+ as a belief but as characterizing an 
attitude or commitment or approach - as a summary statement 
of a guideline or policy for what is to be regarded as well 
supported. But the argument is consistent with the second 
alternative, and so, if the argument functions as a guide to 
understanding what is meant by a "stance", the second alter- 
native should not be neglected. 
How the issue plays out with the second formulation of the 
argument turns on our understanding of "rejection". 
On a first reading one might say: If Q is some metaphysical 
principle or proposition, to say that E+ implies the rejection of 
Q is understood to mean that the truth of Q is incompatible 
with E+B, requiring that, if E+ is true, Q is false, or truth 
valueless, or nonsense (45). On this reading, since E+ itself is a 
value of Q, an instance of a metaphysical thesis, E+ does in- 
deed undermine itself, and one must conclude that empiricism 
cannot be understood as advancing any such E+ as explicit 
dogma or doctrine. But as a second reading we could say that 
for E+ to imply the rejection of Q is for E+ to imply that Q 
cannot be rationally mandated. Then indeed, E+ applied to 
itself shows that E+ cannot be rationally mandated. But not 
that it cannot be believed. 
I will mention a variant of the second reading because I 
suspect that it gets at the heart of van Fraassen's dissatisfaction 
with "metaphysics". Understand "rejection" so that to reject Q 
is not to conclude that it is false, or truthvalueless, or mean- 
ingless but that it is not be accorded the same epistemic status 
as known empirical facts or facts supportable from known 
empirical facts. Again what follows is that, if to be an empiricist 
is to believe some such E+[, it will be an E+ not to be accorded 
the same epistemic status as what is empirically grounded. 
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2. THE IDEA OF AN EXPLICIT STANCE 
We have seen that there need be no incoherence or similar 
reflexivity problem with "Experience is the source of all con- 
tingent information" by itself. But you are in trouble if you add 
that "Experience is the source of all contingent information" is 
itself contingent, is a piece of information, that this information 
cannot have its source in experience, and that to count as 
"information" a statement needs a "source", that is some basis 
for belief. This immediately gives an alternative way of 
expressing the weaker conclusion of the argument: If the other 
premises are maintained, what follows is that "Experience is the 
source of all contingent information" is not itself a piece of 
information. But that could be because the statement should 
not be regarded as the object of belief at all, or because the 
belief in question is held without the sort of grounding that 
makes the epithet "information" appropriate. 
To spell this out I will introduce a specialized reading of the 
word "thesis": I will say that someone believes a statement as a 
thesis if they also believe, or expect, or even just hope that, in 
the context under consideration, the statement is susceptible to 
rational support of the kind that makes it uniquely defensible as 
opposed to its contraries. The "susceptible to rational support" 
may be only "in principle", may be hopelessly out of practical 
reach. One can believe something but not in any such frame of 
mind, and so not as a thesis in this technical sense. For 
example, gamblers can fervently believe that their lucky number 
is about to come up. (Note also that such a gambler's belief 
would hardly count as "information".) 
In the special case of empiricism the problem need not be, as 
van Fraassen concludes, that "[t]here cannot be such a prop- 
osition as E+ "; the problem can be that one advances an E+ as 
a thesis. van Fraassen's slighting of the option of belief, but not 
as a thesis, may be that he doubts that this is the interesting 
case. This is connected with his contrast between belief and 
acceptance2 and is well illustrated with his extended examina- 
tion of materialism: A clear thesis would require saying what 
counts as "material" or "physical", but since this requirement 
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can not be met we make much better sense of the tradition of 
materialism by understanding it as an attitude, a guideline, an 
approach, a commitment to connecting our accounts of phe- 
nomena with the understanding presented by our current 
physics. 
The option of "believe but not as a thesis" may have little 
application, but nonetheless the condition, "not as a thesis", 
proves useful in spelling out the notion of a stance. What is at 
issue is the traditional view that our epistemic guides should be 
formulated as theses, in the specialized sense I described. We 
retain the idea of having epistemic guides - we could hardly do 
otherwise and remain deliberative agents. But we reject holding 
these as theses3. So a stance, more specifically an epistemic 
stance, is an epistemic guide believed or advanced in some other 
manner, but not as a thesis. The question then is - if not as a 
thesis, then what? I urge that it is a mistake to look for any 
closed form, any exactly stated and universally applicable an- 
swer to this question. 
I suggest that the idea of a stance should be taken to be an 
open-ended notion, and insofar as it is positively characterized, 
characterized functionally. We need guidelines for ways to form 
and evaluate beliefs. An epistemic stance is such a guideline. To 
characterize an epistemic stance as an epistemic guide is to 
characterize it functionally, in terms of what it does. It makes 
no more sense to try to say both exactly and generally what 
things will count as an epistemic stance than it would be to say 
exactly what physical objects will count as chairs or valve lift- 
ers. Of course, given the functional characterization of chairs or 
valve lifters and the facts of physics we can say a lot of relevant 
things, such as that a chair or valve lifter can not be made out 
of very soft material. 
What then, positively, can be said about an epistemic stance? 
Another general theme that van Fraassen pursues at length, but 
that I can not examine in any detail here, is that to operate as 
an epistemic guide, but not as a thesis, a stance will be a matter 
of personal decision and commitment, if only by default by 
being presumed by the traditions of one's community. In par- 
ticular, when it comes to critical examination, a stance will have 
This content downloaded from 128.120.194.195 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 01:36:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
164 PAUL TELLER 
more in common with debate over values than we had sup- 
posed. There is, of course, a great, great deal more that can - 
and I hope will - be said, especially by approaching the topic 
through careful examination of specific cases. But do not expect 
there to be some completely determinate and static theory of 
what a stance is. Functionally characterized, it can be expected 
itself to be a notion that evolves to meet our evolving needs and 
situation in the world. 
So far the notion of a stance, whether a belief or some other 
sort of attitude or commitment (a belief is itself, after all, a kind 
of commitment) has been something that we think of as 
explicitly formulated, what I will call an explicit stance. Chapter 
4, as I will interpret it, introduces a complementary notion of 
an implicit stance. 
3. THE ARGUMENT OF CHAPTER 4 
Suppose one has a "canon" for dealing with some subject 
matter, comprising a body of explicit statements describing 
what are taken to be facts, correct principles, procedures, and 
the like. There are three problems in using such a canon: 
identifying what belongs to the canon - there is room for doubt 
about what are the canon's authentic elements; interpreting the 
canon's explicit statements - there is always room for alterna- 
tive interpretations; and applying the canon - how does the 
canon get applied to new cases. (If the canon includes explicit 
rules for application to new cases there will always be the 
possible issue of alternative interpretations of such rules, in 
which case the third problem may be seen as a special case of 
the second.) As an example bearing on empiricism van Fraas- 
sen cites Newton's fourth rule of reasoning: 
"In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by 
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, not- 
withstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, until such time 
as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate, 
or liable to exception."... [But] [h]ow do we identify the phenomena? What 
do they mean (that is, how do we distinguish an accurate minimal 
description from one that amounts to a hypothesis by effectively adding an 
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interpretive lement)? Finally, what is this general induction, i.e., what are 
the implications of the phenomena? (127) 
To deal with such difficulties one could formulate rules for 
identifying authentic elements of the canon, rules for interpre- 
tation, and if they are not already included, rules for application. 
But, of course, the three problems will arise for the newly for- 
mulated rules. We are off on a regress. van Fraassen concludes 
from these considerations that there can be no firm and fixed 
epistemic foundations explicitly expressed as a text (132, 133). 
Why do we not notice these problems in practice? Because 
we take ourselves to understand or to be able to recognize what 
belongs to our canon, how it is to be understood, and how it is 
to be applied. That is to say, a community has a "tradition", a 
collection of interpretive practices as I will call them, that are 
used to apply the canon. We employ skills that we learn as part 
of our training in practical matters, including understanding 
the language in which the canon is expressed, but including a 
broad range of practices that a community passes on from 
generation to generation as intuitively practiced procedural 
knowledge. One can seek to express such procedural knowledge 
in explicit protocols, of course; but then the protocols them- 
selves must be identified, interpreted, and applied. At any stage 
of our epistemic development we rely on some interpretive 
practices. In as much as these interpretive practices go unex- 
pressed, the regress is stopped.4 
This argument against epistemic foundationalism calls our 
attention to an inescapable role for taking what is in important 
respects very like a stance in the foregoing explicit sense. Our 
explicit pronouncements as to facts and procedure must be 
applied by use of an individual's and a community's collective 
interpretive practices. In the normal course of things these 
practices are learned and accepted without critical examination. 
Though for the most part these skills are exercised unreflec- 
tively, the fact that we reliably employ such practices shows 
that we are committed to them. Among these practices are 
many that function as epistemic guides, not held as theses 
(if only because they do not comprise explicit beliefs), and 
so constitute essential parts of our overall epistemic stance. 
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Insofar as such an aspect of our epistemic stance goes unex- 
pressed, I will call it an implicit stance. While the argument and 
examples of Chapter 2 focused on philosophical doctrines as 
stances, the implicit commitments of our practical epistemic 
(and other) guiding practices go far beyond subjects about 
which we self-consciously philosophize. 
4. STANCE AS POLICY 
Talk of taking a stance is a metaphor. Earlier I cautioned 
against looking for any determinate and fixed "theory" of what 
constitutes a stance but suggested that there was a great deal 
more that could be illuminatingly said. I will illustrate the kind 
of thing I have in mind by briefly exploring what I think is an 
extremely closely related metaphor, that of adopting a policy. 
Here are some things that I take to be characteristic of adopting 
a policy: 
1. To adopt a policy is to resolve or to commit oneself to acting 
or making decisions as described by the statement of the 
policy 
2. A policy is not something that is true or false. Instead policies 
are evaluated as being well or ill advised, conducive to certain 
ends, easy or difficult to administer, and in many other 
practical respects. 
3. Polices are generally not rigid in the sense that their rec- 
ommendations may be overridden by other criteria or poli- 
cies. For example, I might have a policy never to wear brown 
because I am slightly blue/green colorblind and so have 
difficulty judging which browns match. But I might override 
that policy if a friend, whose color judgment I trust, picks 
out brown clothing for me. Or, I might override the policy 
because I need unusually warm clothing and the only suffi- 
ciently warm jacket available happens to be brown. The first 
example illustrates how a policy can be overridden on the 
basis of facts not taken into account when it was formulated. 
The second example illustrates how a policy can be over- 
ridden as well because the values of which it is an expression 
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(wanting my clothing not to clash in colors) is in conflict 
with other values (wanting to stay warm). 
4. Policies are always in need of interpretation and insofar are 
open-ended. For any policy there will be possible cases that 
might come up for which the statement of the policy will 
not make clear whether the case falls under the policy and 
possible cases for which it is not clear how the policy dic- 
tates that the case should be treated. When such a case 
comes up a decision is required about how to treat the case. 
For many such cases there will be other criteria in terms of 
which such decisions can be evaluated, but there will never 
be criteria set in advance which will govern evaluation of all 
such cases. 
5. Policies are also open-ended in regard to the question of how 
they are applied, and in so far involve further respects of 
non-rigidity, interpretation, and judgment as discussed in 3, 
4, and 6 below. 
6. The process of interpretation required in administering a 
policy involves judgment. For example, I might have a 
policy not to lie. Most cases are clear-cut: I violate that 
policy if I tell you I mailed the letter you asked me to mail 
when I know that I did not. But have I lied if I tell you that I 
mailed it when, having forgotten, I hand delivered it instead? 
And what do I do if I am unsure whether it is cold enough to 
warrant wearing the possibly clashing warm jacket? In such 
cases we have to make a decision. The faculty of judgment 
on the basis of which we make such decisions in many sit- 
uations and in many respects involves, at least in important 
respects, capacities better described in terms of non-cogni- 
tive skills rather than capacities to reason. 
7. Policies are, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, 
expressions or implementations of values. To adopt the 
policy of not lying is an explicit expression of values. To 
adopt the policy of washing my dishes immediately after 
dinner every night might reflect the value of not wanting my 
home to get too messy, together with the factual knowledge 
of myself that without the discipline of a regular schedule 
the dirty dishes will pile up. 
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8. Policies also function to streamline the decision making 
process in ways called for because of practical, human lim- 
itations. For example, trainers of seeing-eye dogs might have 
the policy only to use Labrador Retrievers. Labs are known 
to provide very good seeing eye dogs and are readily avail- 
able, while (let us suppose) resources are not available to 
make judgments on a case-by-case basis or to make close 
comparisons with other breeds. Note that in opting to let a 
policy cover for more exact factual information values are 
again playing a role. In this case there is a combined value 
and factual judgment that the cost of closer examination of 
candidate dogs for training is not worth the expected gains. 
9. One may argue for or against policies. It does not follow 
from the fact that policies are things to which we commit 
ourselves, and so a matter reflecting choice and values, that 
we cannot argue for or against policies. However, such 
arguments cannot appeal only to matters of fact. Since to 
adopt a policy involves implementation of values, an argu- 
ment for or against a policy must turn, at least in part, on 
prior commitment to values as well as on claimed matters of 
fact. In particular, an argument for or against a policy will 
often appeal to some other more general policy. For exam- 
ple, I might argue for a policy of non-discrimination in 
hiring on the basis of a more general policy of treating 
people equitably, in turn argued for (ustified, we often say) 
on the basis of the policy of treating people as ends, never 
merely as means. 
Taking an explicit stance is very like adopting an explicitly 
stated policy. In addition, it is easy to see our interpretive 
practices as rather like tacit policy. It is a good question why 
van Fraassen chose the term "stance" rather than "policy". 
Perhaps "stance" better than "policy" connotes implicit as well 
as explicit modes; and perhaps 'stance' better foregrounds the 
essential role of values, to which fact, van Fraassen is eager to 
show, we have paid far too little attention. As the foregoing 
discussion of policies makes clear, this kind of idea involves an 
intimate interplay between (what are regarded as) facts and 
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values. Indeed, the interplay may be intimate enough to blur 
the distinction, a distinction that conversely, when taken to be 
sharp, may function only as an idealization. van Fraassen's 
treatment provides a wealth of further considerations that work 
to bring such interplay to light. 
Comparison with the idea of a policy also provides one 
avenue by which to approach two large issues that I can only, 
as van Fraassen himself does (see pp. 61-62, 107-108, 133, 142- 
143) acknowledge: Doesn't the conclusion that our epistemic 
guides are stances and not theses immediately imply some kind 
of relativism? In so far as the basis of some discussion is taken 
to be a matter of stance rather than thesis, how are we to 
understand the nature of reasonable debate? Many will see in 
these issue implications of van Fraassen's position that are so 
disastrous as to warrant rejecting it out of hand. But he has 
offered us arguments that, I believe, we cannot afford to ignore. 
And far form thinking that these problems are hopeless, I be- 
lieve that facing them will inspire us to engage in a rich and 
fruitful rethinking of the nature of the whole philosophical 
enterprise. 
NOTES 
* My thinking for this paper has been helped immeasurably by discussion 
of The Empirical Stance with Gaby Nevitt, Karen Neander, Pekka Vayry- 
nen, Jim Griesemer, and Kevin Hoover; and by comments from Anja Ja- 
urnig. 
lI will work with van Fraassen's term, "information", in this context taken 
to involve belief, thus a narrower notion than one encompassing, e.g., the 
information in a DNA sequence. Information in this sense requires that the 
belief in question has some reliability conferring justification, source, or 
basis. 
2 Space does not permit following this up. For the contrast see Teller (2001, 
pp. 126-127) and references therein. 
3 A more detailed exposition might qualify this as "reject holding these as 
fundamental theses", allowing that given a "local foundation", the basis on 
which we work and argue in the present context, an epistemic guide, argued 
on the basis of the local foundation, can count as a thesis, in a notion of 
thesis relativized to the local foundation. 
4 This paragraph summarizes some of the material in pp. 125-143. 
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